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NARROWING THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN: WHY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION NEEDS TO AMEND THE 
PROPOSED DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION 
y the time a current thirteen-year-old is applying for col-
lege, or starting her professional career, she will have a 
social media history of her entire adolescence. However, due to 
a proposed regulation, citizens of the European Union may 
soon be able to contact a website and effectively demand the 
permanent removal of any and all unwanted content from the 
website’s server.1 This is part of the European Commission’s 
January 2012 proposal to overhaul the EU’s personal data pri-
vacy laws.2 If the European Parliament and European Council 
approve the proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
(“Regulation”), citizens of the EU will gain a new right called 
the “Right to be Forgotten.”3 
The proposed Right to Be Forgotten empowers individuals to 
assert greater control over their reputations and identities on 
the Internet, but further analysis reveals glaring issues with 
its effect on freedom of expression and notions of privacy.4 This 
controversial right would grant individual citizens the ability 
to demand the permanent removal of personal content from the 
Internet. This could be content posted either by themselves or 
by third parties.5 While the Regulation provides exceptions for 
																																																																																																																												
 1. Anne Bezanco, The Right to Be Forgotten: Protecting Digital Privacy, 
FORBES (Aug. 2, 2012, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/08/02/the-right-to-be-forgotten-
protecting-digital-privacy/. 
 2. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Pro-
tection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Com-
mission Proposal], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. 
 3. Bezanco, supra note 1. 
 4. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-
paradox/right-to-be-forgotten. 
 5. Commission Proposal, supra note 2, art. 17. 
B
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content deemed artistic, journalistic, or literary, it leaves the 
determination of what constitutes an exception to the entity in 
charge of its removal (i.e. Google or Facebook). Furthermore, it 
penalizes companies for noncompliance. This has the potential 
to forcefully transform the role of these Internet companies 
from hosts to censors.6 
Courts around the world are beginning to tackle the issue of 
who controls personal content once it is posted to the Internet 
and the degree to which individuals can control their online 
reputations.7 For example, two women in Argentina recently 
won lawsuits both claiming the Right to be Forgotten.8 Virginia 
Da Cunha, an Argentinian pop star, sued Google and Yahoo! to 
take down explicit photographs posted to the Internet.9 These 
were photographs that she consented to but did not wish to be 
widely published on the Internet.10 After Da Cunha won on ap-
peal, the content was removed from the Internet; a query on 
Yahoo!’s search engine in Argentina for the material will pro-
duce no search results.11 Similarly, an Argentinian model for 
Sports Illustrated, Yesica Toscanini, demanded Yahoo! take 
down photographs of her drinking at a party that had been 
posted to the Internet.12 The court “ordered Yahoo! to block 
‘Yesica’ searches while the two sides appeal[ed].”13 Through the 
deletion of their presence on the Internet, these two cases ex-
																																																																																																																												
 6. Id. arts. 17(3)(a), 80. 
 7. There have been at least 130 similar cases since 2006 for issues related 
to individual’s requesting the removal of personal content from the Internet. 
Vinod Sreeharsha, Google and Yahoo Win Appeal in Argentine Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/technology/internet/20google.html. 
 8. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2012, 
2:23 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/the-right-to-
be-forgotten/309044; Robert Krulwich, Is the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ the ‘Big-
gest Threat to Free Speech on the Internet’?, NPR (Feb. 24, 2012, 9:06 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/krulwich/2012/02/23/147289169/is-the-right-to-be-
forgotten-the-biggest-threat-to-free-speech-on-the-internet. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, supra note 8. 
 12. Krulwich, supra note 8. 
 13. Id. 
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emplify the potential chilling effect the Right to Be Forgotten 
may have on individuals around the world.14 
This Note will argue that the ambiguity in implementation 
and enforcement of the Right to Be Forgotten will have a 
chilling effect on freedom of expression that outweighs its per-
sonal privacy benefits. It will then propose several solutions to 
reduce this chilling effect, while maintaining the Regulation’s 
goals of granting individual’s control over their online reputa-
tions. While the policy and goal behind the EU’s proposed 
“Right to Be Forgotten” empowers individuals to take control of 
their reputation and privacy, it is problematic for multiple rea-
sons. For example, the penalty for noncompliance creates a dis-
incentive for companies to genuinely evaluate Internet content 
to determine whether it falls within an exception named within 
the Regulation. Part I introduces Article 17, the Right to Be 
Forgotten, provides an overview of the Right to be Forgotten’s 
basis in EU privacy rights, and compares the right to U.S. pri-
vacy law. Part II analyzes the positive and negative aspects of 
the Right to Be Forgotten and suggests changes to make com-
pliance more effective. Part III analogizes the Right to Be For-
gotten to a theory of copyright law showing that the current 
draft of the Regulation will result in regulatory overreach. Fi-
nally, Part IV examines nonlegislative solutions to data priva-
cy, finding that the Right to Be Forgotten is the best method to 
provide personal data privacy protection. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIVACY OVERVIEW 
In a speech at the January 2012 Innovation Conference Digi-
tal, Life, Design in Munich, Vivian Redding, Vice President of 
the European Commission, outlined the Commission’s proposal 
to overhaul the 1995 Directive on European Union Data Pro-
tection.15 By implementing a new regulation in place of the ex-
																																																																																																																												
 14. Incidentally, one can still conduct an Internet search on both Yahoo! 
and Google in the United States and obtain a large amount of content on both 
women. A search for “Yesica Toscanini” and “Virginia Da Cunha” in Google’s 
search engine produces hundreds of thousands of articles and photos on the 
women. 
 15. Press Release, Vivian Redding, Vice President, Eur. Comm’n, The EU 
Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Mod-
ern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age 2 (Jan. 22, 2012), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_en.htm. 
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isting directive, the EU seeks to harmonize the laws on data 
protection among its twenty-seven member states and provide 
legal certainty to all European citizens.16 Under EU law, a di-
rective is legislation that serves as a guideline for member 
states and requires each member state to transpose the di-
rective into its own national legislation within a specified peri-
od of time.17 Alternatively, a regulation does not require trans-
position but instead immediately becomes law within each 
member state upon adoption.18 Therefore, by proposing a regu-
lation rather than a directive, the Commission seeks to create a 
unified and universal right immediately upon the enactment of 
the proposal.19 
The new regulation serves two purposes: to encourage busi-
ness that promotes the protection of personal data and to pro-
vide transparency and control to individuals.20 Viewing person-
al data as Internet currency, the Commission attempts to es-
tablish stability and trust in this currency through the pro-
posed Regulation.21 In line with these goals, the purpose of the 
Right to Be Forgotten is to “give individuals better control of 
their own data.”22 This stems from concern for an individual’s 
interest in controlling personal information that is available on 
the Internet.23 In acknowledging the “almost unlimited search 
and memory capacity” of the Internet, the Right to Be Forgot-
ten recognizes that “it is the individual who should be in the 
best position to protect the privacy of their data by choosing 
whether or not to provide it.”24 However, this new right is not 
																																																																																																																												
 16. Id. 
 17. DAVID BENDER, A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA PRIVACY §51.04 (rev. 
2013); CDT Analysis of the Proposed Data Protection Regulation, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-
DPR-analysis.pdf. 
 18. Bender, supra note 17. 
 19. GEORGE BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM DAVEY & ELEANOR FOX, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 230 (3d ed. 2011)., at 230; 
Redding, supra note 15, at 2. 
 20. Redding, supra note 15, at 5. 
 21. Id. at 15. 
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Vice President Redding goes on to explain that the proposed right is 
intended to protect teenagers from poor judgment and youthful indiscretion. 
By giving people the ability to take down content that they post as teenagers, 
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absolute; there are instances where content falls within one of 
the article’s enumerated exceptions. For Internet content that 
falls within one of the exceptions, providers would not be re-
quired to honor requests to take down the information 
(“takedown request”).25 
A. The Right to Be Forgotten 
Article 17, the “Right to be forgotten and to erasure” contains 
three important sections. First, Section 1 explicitly provides 
that individuals “have the right to obtain from the controller 
the erasure of personal data relating to them and the absten-
tion from further dissemination of such data, especially in rela-
tion to personal data which are made available by the data sub-
ject while he or she was a child . . .”26 Section 1 is in line with 
the Regulation’s emphasis on protecting children and young 
adults from reputational harm caused by the existence of old, 
undesirable content posted to the Internet.27 Second, Section 2 
then charges the “controller” of the data to inform third-party 
entities that are processing the data of the subject’s request for 
erasure.28 The controller is also responsible for the takedown.29 
Section 3 states that “the controller shall carry out the erasure 
without delay, except to the extent that the retention of the 
personal data is necessary.”30 Third, Section 3 carves out sev-
eral exceptions where retention of personal data in light of a 
takedown request is considered necessary. The exceptions are 
(a) for exercising freedom of expression, including works desig-
nated as artistic, literary, or journalistic; (b) public interest re-
garding public health; (c) historical, statistical, and scientific 
research purposes; and (d) for retention of personal data by the 
EU or member state under state law.31 Complications arise un-
der the current draft of the Regulation because the penalty for 
																																																																																																																												
they have greater ability to control their future professional presence on the 
Internet, and not be haunted by their potential teenage indiscretions. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Commission Proposal, supra note 2, art. 17(1). 
 27. Redding, supra note 15. 
 28. Commission Proposal, supra note 2, art. 17(2). 
 29. Id. art. 17(1). 
 30. Id. art. 17(3). 
 31. Id. arts. 17(3), 80. 
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noncompliance could cost controllers up to 1% of its global 
earnings.32 
Although the Right to be Forgotten is a new concept in rela-
tion to the Internet, it is derived from existing notions of priva-
cy. European countries have strong traditions of protecting in-
dividual privacy and limiting personal content published in 
public forums.33 The origin of this notion is derived from the 
French concept le Doit a l’Oubli, which loosely translates to 
“the right to oblivion.”34 If enacted, Article 17 of the Regulation 
would codify a modern version of this concept into EU law.35 
The French notion of privacy allows people to escape their past 
and control what is said about them.36 Similar notions of priva-
cy can be found in other countries across Europe.37 The ap-
proach to privacy by these European countries, particularly 
France and Germany, is “diametrically opposed” to the United 
																																																																																																																												
 32. Id. art. 79(5)(c); Peter Bright, Europe Proposes a ‘Right to be forgotten,’ 
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 25, 2012, 8:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/01/eu.proposes-a-right-to-be-forgotten; Peta-Anne Barrow, The 
Right to Be Forgotten, PROSKAUER PRIVACY L. BLOG (May 15, 2012), 
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2012/05/articles/articles/the-right-to-be-
forgotten. 
 33. A famous example of this concept of privacy from the late nineteenth 
century is the publication of a scandalous photograph of an aging Alexander 
Dumas and Adah Isaacs Menken. The aging author and young American ac-
tress’s love affair was published and publicized by a paparazzo. Dumas and 
Menken sued. The court held that “posing for the photographs did not mean 
Dumas and Menken had surrendered their rights to privacy and dignity, 
even if they consented to just that during a heady romantic moment.” Bob 
Sullivan, ‘La Difference’ is stark in EU, US privacy laws, NBC NEWS (Oct. 19, 
2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15221111/ns/technology_and_science-
privacy_lost/t/la-difference-stark-eu-us-privacy-laws. 
 34. Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking about the Right to Oblivion, PETER 
FLEISCHER: PRIVACY…? (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:59 AM), 
http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-thinking-about-right-to-
oblivion.html; see also Rosen supra note 4. 
 35. See Fleischer, supra note 34. 
 36. See Jeanne Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & 
Brandeis Tort Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 
1219, 1261 (1994). This concept allows individuals who have been convicted of 
a crime to prevent the publication of facts about their crime. Rosen, supra 
note 4. 
 37. See Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be Forgotten: A 
Transatlantic Clash, in HAFTUNGSRECHT IM DRITTEN MILLENNIUM [LIABILITY IN 
THE THIRD MILLENNIUM] 285, 287 (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009). 
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States’ approach.38 Where the United States values the First 
Amendment protections of freedom of expression far more than 
individual privacy, European countries place a greater premi-
um on individual privacy.39 
For example, two men convicted of murder in Germany sued 
Wikimedia, Wikipedia’s parent company, to remove their 
names from the English language Wikipedia page of their 
German victim.40 The German editors of Wikipedia removed 
the convicts’ names from the German language site upon re-
quest, but the two men wanted their names removed from the 
site internationally as well.41 Claims of this nature would fail 
in the United States on First Amendment grounds, but the 
German editors of Wikipedia removed the content avoiding a 
lengthy lawsuit.42 In the United States, the First Amendment 
protects the publication and dissemination of factual content; 
whereas in Germany, laws prioritize the protection of individu-
al privacy over freedom of expression, even over the disclosure 
of factually accurate information.43 
The history of French and German privacy law informs the 
EU perspective of privacy and shows how the Right to Be For-
gotten is compatible with the European privacy framework. 
Throughout its evolution, the EU looked to member state laws 
and constitutions to establish community law.44 Initially, the 
EU had no codified catalogue of fundamental human rights, 
but instead derived fundamental human rights from member 
state constitutions.45  Eventually, fundamental human rights 
were recognized by the EU through the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights (“Convention”). The Con-
vention established privacy and freedom of expression as fun-
																																																																																																																												
 38. Rosen, supra note 4. 
 39. See Hauch, supra note 36 (citing Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Damages and the 
Privacy Tort: Sketching a Legal Profile, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1111, 1133 (1979)). 
See also Werro, supra note 37, at 289. 
 40. See John Schwartz, Two German Killers Demanding Anonymity Sue 
Wikipedia’s Parent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A13; see also Walter 
Sedlmayr, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Sedlmayr (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 41. Schwartz, supra note 40. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 230. 
 45. Id. 
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damental rights under a unified standard applicable to all 
member states.46 In order to understand the evolution of priva-
cy law that the Right to Be Forgotten stems from, it is neces-
sary to look at specific member state privacy laws. Specifically, 
French and German law highlight the extent of privacy rights, 
and exemplify how the Right to Be Forgotten is an adoption of 
historical protections in a modern context. 
B. Analysis of French and German Notions of Privacy 
The French legal system has long respected “personality 
rights,” which include the “right to control the use of one’s im-
age, and the right to protect one’s honor and reputation.”47 Cod-
ified in the French Civil Code, Article 1382 states that “[a]ny 
human act whatsoever which causes damage to another, obli-
gates him by whose fault the act occurs to repair the dam-
age.”48 Furthermore, French Civil Code Article 1383 states that 
“[e]ach individual is responsible for the damage he causes not 
only by his acts, but also by his negligence or imprudence.”49 
Application of these articles resulted in the establishment of 
strict liability in French tort law. Thus, if someone published 
imagery without the subject’s consent, the publisher’s “mental 
state is irrelevant” in determining liability.50 The focus of the 
law is instead on the subjective emotional suffering of the indi-
vidual in instances where the individual’s privacy was violat-
ed.51 Furthermore, the French idea that “personality rights are 
inherently inalienable, has led the French courts to find liabil-
ity even for republication of private facts that have been previ-
																																																																																																																												
 46. Id. at 215. 
 47. Hauch, supra note 36, at 1228. 
 48. Hauch, supra note 36, at 1232 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 
(Fr.)). 
 49. Hauch, supra note 36, at 1232 (citing C. CIV. art. 1383 (Fr.)). 
 50. Hauch, supra note 36, at 1234. 
 51. The first application of these principles occurred in 1858 in a case re-
ferred to as the “Rachel affair.” Photographs of a famous French actress on 
her deathbed were commissioned by her family and subsequently exposed 
publicly, causing emotional harm to the surviving family. The published im-
ages could only have been created by a person present at the scene or with 
access to the private photographs. The court famously held that reproduc-
tions of private photographs without the consent of the person captured in 
the photograph are a violation of the individuals’ privacy. Hauch, supra note 
36, at 1233–34. 
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ously revealed to the public with the plaintiff’s knowledge or 
consent.”52 This approach reflects the French view of privacy as 
a moral right.53 Granting permission for use of certain personal 
private facts or photographs in one context does not necessarily 
grant a blanket authorization for use in other forums.54 For ex-
ample, in a modern context, granting a website permission to 
use a photograph may not be a blanket license for other web-
sites to republish the photograph without permission. The 
Right to be Forgotten is an extension of the French concept of 
privacy by granting individuals’ more autonomy over their per-
sonal or private content on the Internet. 
Building on the protections in Articles 1382 and 1383, France 
enacted civil and criminal protections of privacy under Article 9 
and Article 22 to define the breadth of privacy rights.55 The 
scope of these rights is quite expansive, including “family [and 
romantic] life, sexual activity and orientation, illness and death 
. . . private repose and leisure . . . the human body . . . and cer-
tain aspects of social life and lifestyle . . . [including] familial 
relations56 and procreative activities . . .”57 The breadth of these 
																																																																																																																												
 52. Id. at 1234. 
 53. Id. 
 54. An example of a case where the court found the republication of pri-
vate information to violate an individual’s privacy is “The Chaplin Affair.” In 
the 1960s, Charlie Chaplin collaborated on an autobiography with a journal-
ist and later granted the same journalist an exclusive interview. Content 
from this interview was used for an article published in France and Germa-
ny. Lui magazine later restructured the content of the previously published 
articles; resulting in the appearance that Chaplin granted Lui an exclusive 
interview. Chaplin sued Lui magazine asserting violation of Article 1382 for 
recharacterization of the article and violation of his right to privacy under 
Article 9 for republishing the private facts. Lui appealed the case all the way 
to the Cour de cassation, where the court held that the republication of pri-
vate content violated Chaplin’s right to privacy. The court recognized that the 
“right to oppose republication” is not an absolute right, citing potential excep-
tions for the fair use of facts with historical value. Id. at 1266–69. 
 55. Id. at 1242. 
 56. Information on maternity, labor, or even the name of the mother of an 
illegitimate child is protected from unwanted disclosure. Similarly, plans for 
divorce, and even a secret second marriage, are protected. Id. at 1247. 
 57. Even when previously revealed, social and lifestyle choices can be pro-
tected under French Privacy laws. For example, a person participating in a 
Gay Rights demonstration has the right to keep his participation private 
from his family or professional colleagues. Id. at 1247–48. 
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privacy protections shows how “personality rights” are closely 
related to the Right to Be Forgotten. In a country that places a 
high premium on the privacy of its citizens and their ability to 
control their reputation, acknowledging how evolving technolo-
gies and the Internet impact privacy necessitates new protec-
tions like the Right to Be Forgotten. 
Another European country with a strong tradition of protect-
ing privacy rights is Germany. Germany began protecting the 
“right to one’s image” in 1907 through legislative means by en-
acting the Act on Copyright in Works of Visual Arts (Kunstur-
heberrechtsgesetz) (“KUG”), and later established the “general 
personality right” in 1954.58 In the aftermath of the Nazi occu-
pation of Germany, the country was motivated to protect hu-
man dignity and did so by including a provision in the German 
Constitution of 1949 recognizing that “everyone has the right to 
the free development of his personality.”59 Generally, the per-
sonality right explains that “everyone has the right to the free 
development of his personality, in so far as he does not violate 
the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or 
the moral code.”60 
By 1954, the general right to personality was recognized by 
private law.61 A famous case called Herrenreiter, known as the 
gentleman rider case, is an example of German law protecting 
one’s right to personality.62 In Herrenreiter, a man was photo-
graphed in a horse riding competition; his photograph was sub-
sequently used in an advertisement for a sexual stimulant 
without his consent.63 While the man did not suffer material 
damage, the German Supreme Court granted him “damages for 
pain and suffering.”64 The court justified the award of damages 
holding “that a serious injury to personality interests was 
analogous to a violation of a freedom.”65 
																																																																																																																												
 58. See Huw Beverley-Smith, Ansgar Ohly & Agnes Lucas-Schloetter, 
PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY 98–100 (2005). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 100. 
 61. See id. at 101. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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While some personality rights are specifically codified in Ar-
ticle 12 of the German Civil Code, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch and 
in Articles 22 and 23 of the KUG, the more general personality 
right is quite broad.66 This breadth allows for flexibility in ap-
plication of the right, giving courts the freedom to hold a de-
fendant in violation of the right in the absence of specific legis-
lative action.67 While this flexibility in application may be bene-
ficial for courts to find new violations of the right, there also 
																																																																																																																												
 66. Id. at 113. Article 12 protects the right to one’s name: “Whenever the 
right to the use of a name is disputed by another person or whenever the le-
gitimate user’s interest is violated by another person using the same name, 
the legitimate user can demand the cessation of the interference. If any fur-
ther interference is to be expected, he may also apply for injunctive relief.” Id. 
Article 22 of the Act on Copyright in Works of Visual Arts (Kunsturheber-
rechtsgesetz, or KUG) protects the right to one’s image: 
Portraits may only by disseminated or exhibited with the consent of 
the person portrayed. Consent is deemed to have been given if the 
person portrayed has received a remuneration for having the por-
trait taken. For ten years after the death of the person portrayed, 
consent given by the relatives of that person must be obtained. Rela-
tives within the meaning of this section are the surviving spouse and 
the portrayed person’s children and, if neither a spouse nor children 
exist, the portrayed person’s parents. 
Article 23 provides exceptions to Article 22: 
1. Without the consent required by §22 the following may be dissem-
inated and exhibited: 
1. Pictures from the sphere of contemporary history; 
2. Pictures on which persons are only portrayed accidentally 
as parts of a landscape or any other    location; 
3. Pictures of gatherings, processions or similar activities in 
which the persons portrayed      participated; 
4. Pictures not having been made to order, if the dissemina-
tion or exhibition serves a higher interest of art. 
2. This authorization does not justify any dissemination or exhibition 
by which a justified interest of the person portrayed or, if the person 
is deceased, of his relatives is violated. 
Id. at 99, 105 (citing Gesetz betreffend das Urheberrecht an Werken der 
bildenden Künste und der Photographie [KUG] [Act on Copyright in Works of 
Visual Arts], Jan. 9, 1907, arts. 22–23 (Gr.). 
 67. See id. at 113. 
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exists a lack of legal certainty that potentially inhibits people’s 
ability to rely on the right.68 Despite the nebulous character of 
the general personality right, German’s view the right as in-
dispensable.69 In light of this broad perception of the personali-
ty right, the Right to Be Forgotten can be viewed as a modern 
application of this principle. 
C. Analysis of United States Notions of Privacy 
In contrast to the French and German traditions of protecting 
the individual’s right to privacy, the United States takes a very 
different approach. Where countries in Europe protect privacy 
as a fundamental right, the United States protects freedom of 
expression over privacy.70 For example, in the Bill of Rights, 
the First Amendment explicitly protects the freedom of expres-
sion; however no explicit protection exists for privacy.71 In ad-
dition, the United States “fiercely” defends the right to free 
press, but grants no specific right to privacy.72 
Discussion of U.S. privacy law can be traced back to the sem-
inal article written by Warren and Brandeis, published in the 
Harvard Law Review in 1890.73 Warren and Brandeis argue 
that the right to privacy, derived from common law, exists as a 
“right to be let alone.”74 They address the need for privacy pro-
tection from unwanted press or from public dissemination of 
private information created by new inventions and wider publi-
cation of newspapers. 75  Eighty years later, William Prosser 
published an article outlining four distinct privacy rights that 
were later incorporated into the Restatement of Torts.76 These 
four privacy rights include “(1) Intrusion upon a person’s seclu-
																																																																																																																												
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling the EU 
and US Perspectives, 30 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 161, 168–69 (2012). 
 71. See Werro, supra note 37, at 291. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Bennett, supra note 70, at 169; see also Judith DeCew, Privacy,  
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2012 ed.), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/privacy. 
 74. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
 75. DeCew, supra note 73, at § 1.1. 
 76. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); Werro, supra 
note 37, at 292. 
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sion or solitude, or into his private affairs[;] (2) Public disclo-
sure of embarrassing private facts about an individual[;] (3) 
Publicity placing one in a false light in the public eye[;] [and] 
(4) [a]ppropriation of one’s likeness for the advantage of anoth-
er.”77  However, in application these concepts fail to provide 
broad privacy protection due to expanding protections of the 
First Amendment freedom of the press.78 
The First Amendment in the Bill of Rights expressly protects 
freedom of speech whereas the U.S. Constitution is mostly si-
lent with respect to privacy protections for its citizens. In con-
trast to the previous example of Wikipedia removing the Ger-
man convicts’ names from its website, under U.S. jurispru-
dence, court records are matters of public record and available 
for the press to publish.79 For example, in Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn the Court held that no privacy interest was vio-
lated because information disclosed by the broadcasting com-
pany “was taken from publicly available court documents.”80 
Additionally, the Court held in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing 
Co. that so long as information is lawfully acquired and of pub-
lic interest it is publishable.81 These decisions show the import 
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constituted a prior restraint, and the newspaper could not be punished for 
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of the First Amendment in relation to personal privacy in the 
United States.82 
The differences in the approaches to privacy and freedom of 
speech between the United States and European countries, 
such as France and Germany, are significant. One way to look 
at the differences is to highlight the degree of protection given 
to freedom of the press and expression under the First 
Amendment, as compared to the European inclusion of the 
right to personality in both national and EU law.83 The differ-
ences can also be explained by looking to socio-political differ-
ences between Europe and the United States; U.S. law devel-
oped critical of centralized power, while European law origi-
nates from social traditions of aristocracy, honor, and autono-
my.84 The difference in valuing privacy over freedom of expres-
																																																																																																																												
publishing legally acquired truthful information. Smith v. Daily Mail Pub-
lishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
 82. For a more modern reflection of a U.S. court’s application of privacy 
law in the context of social media, see Snyder v. Millersville University. In 
Snyder, a student at a public university was studying education with plans to 
become a teacher upon graduation. However, the university denied her a de-
gree in education, granting her a bachelor of arts in English instead. The rea-
son for denying plaintiff’s degree in education was primarily due to photo-
graphs the plaintiff posted to her Myspace profile. In response, the plaintiff 
filed suit against the university for violation of her First Amendment right to 
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file on a social media website. Snyder v. Millersville University, No. 07-1660, 
2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
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sion is why the Right to Be Forgotten fits within the framework 
of the EU, but conflicts with the values underlying U.S. law. 
These policy implications inform the analysis of the Regulation, 
and show where the Regulation is unclear and needs to be mod-
ified before it becomes effective. 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND PROPOSED CHANGES 
Article 17, the “Right to Be Forgotten and to Erasure,” builds 
on Article 12(b) of the 1995 Directive and is one of the most 
controversial additions to privacy law in the EU.85 The crux of 
the Right to Be Forgotten is to give an individual more control 
over her personal data and content, especially when the data is 
no longer necessary for the purpose it was initially used for.86 
In order to interpret the Right to Be Forgotten, the scope of 
the Regulation must be defined. Article 4 provides definitions 
for certain terms applicable to the Right to Be Forgotten such 
as data subject and personal data: 
(1) ‘data subject’ means an identified natural person or a nat-
ural person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, by 
means reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by any 
other natural or legal person, in particular by reference to an 
identification number, location data, online identifier or to 
one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, ge-
netic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that per-
son; (2) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to a 
data subject.87 
These definitions are quite broad, making the level of certain-
ty required to identify the data subject unclear.88 Furthermore, 
they fail to address how to treat a data subject who is part of a 
group of data subjects, like a photograph of a school class or a 
family.89 For example, if two people are the ‘data subjects’ of 
one photograph and only one of them issues a takedown re-
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quest, the Regulation is unclear as to whose rights must be 
honored.90 As the European Network and Information Security 
Information Agency (“ENISA”) recommends, the Commission 
needs to clarify its definition of who has the right to issue 
takedown requests, and what content qualifies as the data sub-
jects’ personal data, warranting removal.91 
Following a takedown request, Article 17 holds the controller 
responsible for taking reasonable steps to erase the content at 
issue.92 Where information is public, the controller must also 
inform third party processors of the subject’s takedown request, 
which includes links to or copies of the data or content.93 The 
Regulation requires erasure “without delay,” unless the content 
falls within an exception.94 However, what remains unclear is 
who determines whether content satisfies a noted exception. 
Controversy lies in this lack of clarity over analyzing content to 
determine whether it falls within the proscribed exceptions. A 
recently published report by ENISA shares the same concern 
stating that “implementing acts are still needed to clarify how 
this important right will be implemented.”95 
Additionally, the requirement that controllers notify third 
parties that a data subject issued a takedown request may pro-
pose an impossible task. Both the Center for Democracy & 
Technology (“CDT”) and ENISA argue that tracing personal 
data to its data subject and removing it wherever it exists on 
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 91. Id. at 14. The Center for Democracy & Technology also recommends 
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 92. “Controller” is defined in the Regulation under Article 4(5) as “the nat-
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the Internet are technologically impossible tasks.96 Given the 
open-system nature of an expansive portion of the World Wide 
Web, data can be stored and copied from almost any location.97 
The Regulation requires controllers to notify third parties, but 
there is no current technology to trace the source of content 
hosted by third parties. ENISA argues that in “an open system 
it is not generally possible for a person to locate all personal 
data items . . . stored about them[,]”98 and the only technologi-
cally feasible means enforcing the Right to Be Forgotten is in a 
“closed” system.99 In theory, the closed system model could be 
implemented in public networks existing solely within the ju-
risdiction of EU member states with users and providers 
“strongly authenticated using a form of electronic identity that 
can be linked to natural persons.”100 To address these obstacles, 
as an alternative to the broad Right to Be Forgotten, the CDT 
proposes the “Right to Erase.”101 The Right to Erase grants 
similar protections as the Regulation, but limits the request for 
removal of data to a “particular service provider.”102 This itera-
tion of the right would not hold the controller responsible for 
resolving any privacy violations; instead it would force an indi-
vidual with a privacy concern to address the matter directly 
with the entity responsible for the posted material.103 Further-
more, burdening controllers with weighing one subject’s “priva-
cy rights over another’s free expression rights” is too high a 
burden for controllers to bear.104 
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The burden on controllers is exacerbated by the exceptions 
contained in Article 17. The first exception under Article 
17(3)(a) provides for the exercise of “the right of freedom of ex-
pression in accordance with Article 80.”105 Article 80 requires 
exceptions for data “carried out solely for journalistic purposes, 
or the purpose of artistic or literary expression.”106 This excep-
tion is included to reconcile the dichotomy between protecting 
personal data and freedom of expression. 107  Under Article 
80(2), each member state is required to notify the Commission 
of their national provisions for freedom of expression within 
two years from the date the Regulation takes effect.108 This no-
tification requirement will help facilitate compliance with the 
various provisions for freedom of expression throughout Europe 
by implementing the Regulation in compliance with member 
state law. However, this idea also seems to go against the gen-
eral goal of harmonization because it requires the recognition 
of individual member states’ provisions, which could have 
slight differences.109 The Regulation requires compliance with 
member states’ provisions on freedom of expression, and if 
member states have different provisions regarding freedom of 
expression, complying with and honoring them could become 
extremely complicated.110 In addition to guidelines, the Com-
mission could create a review board to step in and provide ad-
vice to controllers in determining whether content falls within 
an exception. 
The second exception is for “reasons of public interest in the 
area of public health in accordance with Article 81.”111 Article 
81 addresses the need to retain information for the purposes of 
medical treatment, diagnosis, public interest in the area of 
public health, and historical statistical data used for research 
purposes.112 Similar to the public health exception, Article 81 
contains the third exception for historical, statistical, and sci-
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entific research purposes.113 Factual data and data of historical 
importance are necessary to retain because of the important 
social value of the information. The fourth exception is for 
“compliance with a legal obligation to retain the personal data 
by Union or Member State law to which the controller is sub-
ject . . .”114 The final exception is for instances where the con-
troller does not need to erase the data, but must restrict pro-
cessing.115 This occurs when the data subject contests its accu-
racy and the controller needs time to verify the claim, because 
the controller must retain the data for purposes of proof, be-
cause “the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes 
their erasure and requests the restriction of their use instead,” 
or because the data subject requests personal data be transmit-
ted to another system.116 
The Commission retains the right to establish criteria for im-
plementing Article 17, which is an important element of the 
Regulation.117  Criteria for implementation of the Regulation 
are necessary, but need to be established before, or in conjunc-
tion with, enactment of the Regulation because without further 
specification or implementation measures, freedom of expres-
sion in the EU is threatened.118 The Regulation leaves vast 
amounts of power in the hands of the controller and it is this 
power that leaves freedom of expression at risk. Controllers 
charged with responding to takedown requests need authorita-
tive guidelines to ensure adequate execution of the Regulation. 
Implementation of the Right to Be Forgotten will require con-
trollers to establish ways to respond to each takedown request 
within a timely manner.119 Not only will this process take time, 
it will require hiring new employees and addressing new is-
sues. Due to the nature of the penalties at stake for failure to 
comply with the Regulation, controllers will be incentivized to 
take content down even when it may in fact be permissible. 
This is because controllers will not want to spend the time, ef-
fort, and resources to analyze each request to determine 
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whether the content holds literary, artistic, or journalistic val-
ue if the penalty for a wrong decision, or not addressing the re-
quest, could result in a US$379 million fine.120 Furthermore, an 
additional complication presents itself as controllers are forced 
to define the scope of the exceptions. For example, the determi-
nation of what constitutes journalistic content. While an article 
posted by a reputable news source is obviously journalistic, cit-
izen journalists reporting and blogging on sites like Tumblr 
and Wordpress represent more nuanced forms of journalism.121 
More definitive definitions of the exceptions are necessary to 
clarify the inevitable confusion involved with analyzing a data 
subject’s request for removal. 
Resolution of the aforementioned issues with the Regulation 
is especially important because one likely result of the imple-
mentation of the Regulation will be vast numbers of privacy 
lawsuits. After the Regulation is enacted, individuals will be 
able to sue companies under EU law in national courts. When 
national courts in member states need clarity of EU law, they 
issue a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice 
to provide its interpretation of the Regulation.122 Waiting for a 
preliminary reference is an inefficient means of obtaining clari-
fication because lawsuits take time, and while the cases are 
pending, there will be uncertainty as to how controllers must 
treat controversial content. 
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A solution to the threatening overreach is to reduce the pen-
alty for noncompliance. A lower punishment would incentivize 
controllers to analyze takedown requests more thoroughly and 
reduce the threat to freedom of expression. Furthermore, the 
Commission will need to issue guidelines for controllers. A 
company facing the daunting task of determining what content 
necessitates compliance with a takedown request needs in-
struction and guidelines from the EU itself.123 
The Right to Be Forgotten fits within the framework of Euro-
pean privacy laws and grants important rights to individual 
citizens of the EU. However, before it is enacted, certain 
amendments must be made. First, the Commission must clarify 
the implementation measures and further define what data can 
be requested for removal and who may make such a request. 
Second, the scope of the Regulation should be reduced to make 
the Right to Be Forgotten technologically feasible.124 Lastly, the 
penalty for violations must be reduced so that it does not lead 
to an overreach, resulting in a dramatic reduction in free ex-
pression on the Internet. 
The penalties imposed for violating the Right to Be Forgotten 
are too high and constitute an overreach that will result in a 
chilling effect on freedom of expression. If controllers comply 
with takedown requests without true and intensive analysis as 
to whether an exception applies, the resulting effect will be the 
unnecessary removal of permissible material. Article 79 of the 
Regulation imposes administrative sanctions for negligent, in-
tentional, and unintentional noncompliance with the articles of 
the Regulation.125 Article 79(5)(c) states, 
The supervisory authority shall impose a fine up to 500 000 
EUR, or in case of an enterprise up to 1% of its annual 
worldwide turnover, to anyone who, intentionally or negli-
gently: . . . . 
(c) does not comply with the right to be forgotten or to eras-
ure, or fails to put mechanisms in place to ensure that the 
time limits are observed or does not take all necessary steps 
to inform third parties that a data subjects requests to erase 
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any links to, or copy or replication of the personal data pursu-
ant Article 17.126 
With potential penalties of up to 1% of a company’s global 
annual revenue, “enterprises” such as Google will be incentiv-
ized to comply with all takedown requests in fear of the super-
visory authority issuing crippling penalties.127 The Regulation 
requires these companies to determine what content falls with-
in the exceptions for “literary, artistic or journalistic” content, 
forcing these enterprises into the role of global censors.128 This 
new requirement puts enterprises in a new role not previously 
required of them and tasks them with the substantial obliga-
tion of analyzing personal content. 
III. ANALOGY TO COPYRIGHT LAW 
A helpful analogy to inform the argument that the Regula-
tion will result in an overreach can be found in copyright law. 
The United States Constitution grants the Federal Govern-
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ment the ability to enact copyright laws “[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”129 Article 1, Section 8 of the United 
States Constitution, along with the Copyright Act, grants copy-
right owners exclusive rights over their creative works.130 How-
ever, this exclusive right is limited.131 The purpose of granting 
these exclusive rights is to motivate creativity and encourage 
artists and writers to continue in their pursuit of the arts.132 
Furthermore, the limitation on the exclusivity of the rights to a 
pre-determined number of years allows future artists and writ-
ers to use older works for their own creative projects once the 
older content enters the public domain. 
However, according to Jason Mazzone, people take advantage 
of copyright laws by asserting exclusive rights over material 
that has already entered the public domain, thereby limiting 
access to the public domain. 133  Mazzone uses the term 
copyfraud “to refer to the act of falsely claiming a copyright in a 
public domain work.”134 Instances of copyfraud run rampant.135 
People claim copyright over material that no longer has a basis 
for a copyright’s exclusivity, which, according to Mazzone, “sti-
fles creativity and imposes financial costs on consumers.”136 
Other factors that contribute to the overreaching of copyright 
laws include the ineffective enforcement mechanisms for claim-
ing false copyright rights.137 There are vast economic incentives 
for museums, institutions, publishers, and filmmakers to assert 
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false copyright on material.138 This is because people rarely 
challenge copyrighted material, and sanctions are rarely im-
posed against false copyright assertions.139 Under the Copy-
right Act, there are no civil remedies against improper asser-
tions of copyright.140 However, two provisions criminalize false 
assertions: Section 506(c) for fraudulent copyright notices and 
Section 506(e) for false representation.141 Mazzone notes that 
despite the criminal provisions within the Copyright Act, there 
are very few prosecutions for false assertions, creating a mini-
mal threat to those who falsely claim copyright to work in the 
public domain.142 Without the deterrent of criminal prosecu-
tion, there is no threat to the expanding use of copyfraud. As 
Mazzone states, “[t]he point of copyright is to promote creativi-
ty,” however the imbalanced statutory protections granted to 
copyright owners’ exclusive rights are far stronger than the lit-
tle protection for works that exist in the public domain.143 
Because of copyfraud, expression and artistic creation are be-
ing squelched.144 According to Mazzone, claims of “fair use” are 
diminishing because the doctrine is applied in inconsistent 
ways, leading to uncertainty amongst artists about what works 
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require permission for use. 145  This uncertainty leads to an 
overreach of copyright laws. 
Mazzone’s theory of the overreach that results from 
copyfraud can be analogized to the Right to Be Forgotten. The 
current draft of the proposed Regulation will result in an over-
reach; specifically, it will lead to a substantial amount of con-
tent being removed due to the failure of controllers to apply the 
exceptions provided. Like Mazzone’s copyfraud argument, inef-
fective enforcement allows owners of expired copyrights to pre-
vent use of work that should be part of the public domain, 
thereby restricting the cultural commons. Here, the ineffective 
enforcement is the penalty for noncompliance. If controllers 
fear the government imposing a US$3.7 billion fine for not 
complying with Article 17, there is no incentive for them to le-
gitimately analyze each takedown request to determine wheth-
er it falls within an exception.146 This will result in a chilling 
effect on free speech and free expression, and reduce the mar-
ketplace of ideas.147 
In order to respond to takedown requests, companies will 
need to set up processes and procedures for evaluating these 
requests. Currently, companies that host content do not make 
decisions about the value of the content.148 If the Regulation is 
enacted, these companies will become censors of the Internet as 
they are forced to comply with the Regulation. Additionally, the 
enactment of the Regulation will presumably result in a lot of 
litigation.149 The necessity and value of these exceptions to pro-
tect valuable freedom of expression is evident, however, the 
risk of suppressing expression is high when people can demand 
content re-posted by a third party be permanently removed 
																																																																																																																												
 145. The Fair Use Doctrine does not require permission from the copyright 
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 146. 2012 Financial Table, supra note 120. 
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more ideas that exist in the “marketplace” the more likely people are to come 
to the truth. Justice Holmes first used the phrase in his dissent in Abrams v. 
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ing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1984). 
 148. Reuters, supra note 128. 
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from the Internet.150 One can easily imagine a data subject is-
suing a takedown request for content with substantial journal-
istic value, where a decision to honor or deny a takedown re-
quest may hinge on whether or not the company is threatened 
by the penalty. Similar to Mazzone’s assertion that Internet 
service providers blindly take down content when confronted 
with accusations of infringing content on their websites,151 the 
Regulation will result in blind takedowns by controllers who 
will not risk the crippling fines for violating the Right to Be 
Forgotten. 
Blind takedowns are just one example of how copyfraud and 
The Right to Be Forgotten have the potentially similar effect of 
diminishing expression. The suppression of expression under 
copyfraud is caused by an overreach by owners of expired copy-
rights, whereas the suppression of expression caused by the 
Right to Be Forgotten is created by the controllers’ overreach 
through lack of proper evaluation.152 
IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ADOPTING THE “RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN” 
While opposition to the EU’s overhaul of its data privacy laws 
is great, many still recognize that the changing world of the 
Internet and social media necessitate greater protection and 
control for people and their data.153 Opposition to the proposed 
Regulation comes from resistance to the use of legislation as a 
means to provide the protections contained in the Right to Be 
Forgotten. Professor Jeffrey Rosen, who opposes the proposed 
Right to Be Forgotten, acknowledges that people are “experi-
encing the difficulty of living in a world where the Web never 
forgets, where every blog and tweet and Facebook update and 
MySpace picture about us is recorded forever in the digital 
cloud.”154 However, Rosen theorizes that laws are not the solu-
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tion.155 Instead, technology, evolving Internet norms, and in-
surance schemes are seen as potential alternatives to legisla-
tive means.156 While each of these three solutions proposes in-
teresting alternatives, they do not provide the same compre-
hensive protection or grant individuals the same level of con-
trol and autonomy over their presence on the Internet as the 
Right to be Forgotten. 
Instead of allowing individuals to demand content or data be 
taken down from the Internet, one alternative is to give data 
an expiration date. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, in his book De-
lete, says that giving data an expiration date would allow users 
to determine the length of time they want something to remain 
on the Internet.157 Rosen supports this idea, and even notes 
that similar services already exist.158 TigerText is an example 
of a service that provides expiration dates for data.159 TigerText 
is a cross-platform application that sends encrypted text mes-
sages that have a limited lifespan and will be permanently de-
leted once the message is no longer needed by the user.160 If the 
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use of expiration dates for data became widespread, it may be a 
successful alternative to the proposed Right to Be Forgotten. 
The benefits are similar in terms of giving users more control 
over content they post to the Internet, however, because the 
user would determine the expiration date, this solution fails to 
provide a remedy for content posted by third parties. 
In addition to incentivizing technological alternatives, Rosen 
proposes “norms-based solutions” to the Right to Be Forgot-
ten.161 According to Rosen, creating new norms may be the 
most practical solution to “digital forgetting.”162 Journalists and 
media outlets should exercise judgment when gathering mate-
rial from nonpublic social networking sites and society may 
need to grow more attune to forgiveness and atonement.163 
Consistent respect from journalists and individuals could help 
“construct zones of privacy.” 164 Furthermore, social norms of 
usage among users that embody this respect could help 
strengthen users’ privacy. For example, an overwhelming 
number of people in Japan use pseudonyms on social network-
ing sites.165 A survey conducted in Japan noted that 89% of us-
ers of social media were reluctant to use their real name public-
ly on the Internet.166 Facebook even encountered slow growth 
in Japan because of Japanese preference of anonymity, as well 
as the prevalence of Japan’s own social networking sites.167 
While Facebook states that its purpose is to promote “real-life 
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social relationships online, many Japanese use Web anonymity 
to express themselves, free from the pressures to fit into a con-
formist workplace.”168 Despite the existing norms in Japan, Fa-
cebook has been insistent that new users in Japan “adhere to 
its real-name policy.”169 Because norms of social media usage 
are so deeply entrenched, and because Facebook continues to 
modify its privacy policies in favor of more public disclosure, 
protecting privacy through changing norms would be an uphill 
battle. 
Finally, a third alternative is a scheme for online reputation 
insurance. Evgeny Morozov suggests that instituting a manda-
tory reputation insurance scheme, administered by the gov-
ernment, is an alternative solution to protecting one’s data and 
reputation on the Internet. 170  Morozov postulates that the 
Right to Be Forgotten “is too restrictive and unrealistic,”171 and 
instead suggests insurance would protect people from what he 
calls an “online disaster—a ferocious man-made information 
tsunami that can destroy one’s reputation the way a real tsu-
nami can destroy one’s home.”172 There are several advantages 
to this solution. First, insurance does not alter how the Inter-
net functions.173 Second, victims of reputational harm would be 
provided with compensation.174  And third, mandatory insur-
ance would level the playing field by providing everyone with 
protection, instead of simply protecting individuals and corpo-
rations willing to pay large premiums.175 Furthermore, Moro-
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zov argues that the insurance needs to be mandatory because 
one does not need to be an active user of social media, or even 
use the Internet, to suffer harm.176 Unfortunately, a mandatory 
insurance scheme seems like an unlikely solution. It would on-
ly provide compensation for those who suffer large-scale repu-
tational harm, and provides no solution for those individuals 
who simply regret posting a picture on social media, such as to 
their Facebook profile. One benefit of the Right to Be Forgotten 
is the control it gives individuals over their identity on the In-
ternet.177 An insurance scheme would only compensate people 
after the harm, but not provide the permanent results. 
Of the three alternatives, none provide as comprehensive 
protection as the Right to Be Forgotten. Establishing expira-
tion dates on content is a creative idea to consider moving for-
ward, but it does not solve the issue of deleting older content. 
Furthermore, this solution would only be sufficient if all service 
providers and social media platforms instituted similar tech-
nologies. The Right to Be Forgotten is more comprehensive in 
that it applies to all controllers and does not rely on each ser-
vice provider installing an individual program. Next, the crea-
tion of new norms takes time. For example, Facebook began as 
a social networking page in 2004, and Google began as a search 
engine in 1998;178 people using these platforms have such deep-
ly entrenched norms that it would take years to modify. Not 
only are people inundated with various forms of social media, 
people also use the Internet to “troll” and cause destruction to 
people’s reputations and lives.179 Trolling and cyber-bullying 
are major issues and unfortunate trends that are increasing in 
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frequency. 180  In an ideal world, notions of forgiveness and 
atonement would be honored and respected. People would be 
forgiven for youthful indiscretion or exercising poor judgment 
with regards to their social media presence. Unfortunately we 
do not live in that world. While certain cultures and religions 
promote the values of forgiveness and atonement for sins, soci-
ety cannot be expected to forgive and forget when the Internet 
keeps eternal records. As evidenced by the proposal for the 
Regulation, it appears that the EU wants protection for its citi-
zens now. Finally, reputation insurance would not solve the 
problems the Right to Be Forgotten attempt to solve. The Right 
to Be Forgotten is intended to grant control of one’s personal 
data back to the individual.181 While it is important for people 
to monitor their online presence, services like Reputation.com, 
which help users monitor and control their online presence,182 
do not give people the complete protection that the Right to Be 
Forgotten provides. Protection against reputational harm is 
important for job hunting, but another benefit of the proposed 
Regulation is one’s ability to take down content that is not only 
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harmful, but simply undesirable. The Right to Be Forgotten 
would allow people to delete content they regret posting, not 
just content causing them harm. When weighing freedom of 
expression against privacy rights, the idea that the Regulation 
allows people to issue takedown requests for just about any-
thing, on a whim, combined with the likelihood that service 
providers will just give in to requests to avoid penalties, shows 
how drastic the impact of the Regulation could be. 
CONCLUSION 
The Right to Be Forgotten establishes a universal right of 
privacy for all citizens of the EU, and provides a significant 
amount of autonomy over one’s online identity and reputa-
tion. 183  While this concept receives a significant amount of 
backlash, the Right to Be Forgotten is derived from existing 
European privacy laws. 184  Privacy is a fundamental right 
granted under the European Convention for Human Rights and 
has long been honored by various European countries.185 How-
ever, freedom of expression is also a fundamental right and the 
Right to Be Forgotten, as currently written, leaves freedom of 
expression at risk.186 
Before the European Council and Parliament can enact the 
new Regulation, certain changes must be made. Specifically, 
the Commission must definitively define the scope of the Right 
to Be Forgotten through more specific definitions of ‘data sub-
ject’, ‘personal data’, and elaborate on the implementation cri-
terion.187 Additionally, in light of the technological barriers to 
the Right to Be Forgotten, the Commission should consider the 
CDT’s recommendation to restrict the right to the Right of 
Erasure.188 Furthermore, the penalty for noncompliance must 
be reduced to prevent overreach. Controllers need an incentive 
to legitimately evaluate claims under the Right to Be Forgot-
ten, and imposing a 1% penalty will result in blind compliance 
and a chilling effect on speech.189 Despite the need for these 
																																																																																																																												
 183. See supra Part I. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See supra Part II. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
	
2014] RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 519 
changes, the mere introduction of the Right to Be Forgotten 
shows that the EU is taking huge steps to put control of the 
Internet into the hands of individuals. The Right to Be Forgot-
ten allows people to live life without their past interfering with 
their future. 
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